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Europeanization of Economic Policy in the New Member States 
 
To say that Europeanization is an overused and controversial concept would be an 
understatement, yet a recent substantial increase in scholarly publications on the subject has done 
little to clarify this term. Scholars differ on the definition of Europeanization, the mechanisms 
through which it affects member states (and EU candidate countries), their politics, policies or 
institutions, as well as whether or not Europeanization leads to a conversion of policy outcomes. 
Especially lacking, in this plethora of research, are cross-national studies which capture 
Europeanization in a quantifiable way and estimate its impact while taking into account the 
alternative ways in which Europeanization works. This paper, building on a wide range of 
theoretical and case-studies research, represents one such attempt to measure the impact of 
Europeanization on the economic policy of the now new EU member states from Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE). The first section overviews the many definitions of Europeanization and 
justifies the use of the term to denote change in institutions, policy or preferences as a result of 
the influence of the European Union. This section also elaborates on why scholars should expect 
Europeanization to be present in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) even before these countries 
acceded to the EU. The second section develops a model of Europeanization to be applied to the 
CEE countries and summarizes seven propositions for how various factors affect the process of 
Europeanization of public policy in the CEE. The third section examines, by examples and 
statistical analysis, the extent to which the EU – through various channels of the Europeanization 
process – affects economic policy in the CEE. The final section concludes.  
Defining the Concept of Europeanization 
  The concept of “Europeanization” is defined in a variety of ways, denoting both a process 
of policy change and an outcome (convergence of policies), both at the national and   2
supranational levels. Some scholars view Europeanization as similar to European integration, i.e. 
the “development of European level of distinct structures of governance” (Risse, Cowles and 
Caporaso 2001, 3; Olsen 2002). Olsen (2002, 923-4) further distinguishes between 
Europeanization as (1) a change in the external boundaries of Europe, (2) a political unification 
project or (3) as a process exporting forms of political organization. Most recent scholarship, 
however, agrees on a different and rather specific conceptualization of Europeanization, as the 
impact of the European Union on the national politics and policies of the member states 
(Schmidt 2002, 896), as a direct consequence of the process of European integration (Olsen 
2002, 932).  
Within such a definition scholars further distinguish between the process of changing 
national policies as a result of integration, i.e. of adopting EU rules (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005; Radaelli 2003) and the actual change in policies (Buller and Gamble 2002). 
Radaelli’s definition of Europeanization as the “processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and 
(c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways 
of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU 
policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) 
discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.” (30) is adopted by many recent 
scholars of Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Grabbe 2002; Brusis 2005). 
Such a definition is perhaps the most encompassing one while remaining precise, while Buller 
and Gamble’s definition of Europeanization as a “situation where distinct modes of European 
governance have transformed aspects of domestic politics” (17) is perhaps the most 
parsimonious one. In this paper I focus on the second aspect of Radaelli’s definition 
Europeanization, the diffusion of policies, ideas, practices, etc, while adopting Buller and   3
Gamble’s concept of capturing Europeanization as a policy outcome, observed at the national 
level, as a result of influence stemming from the EU.  
There are two characteristics of Buller and Gamble’s definition which make it useful and 
appropriate for the study of EU’s impact on national-level policies. Firstly, this definition 
focuses on the outcome of Europeanization rather than on the process of change itself, thus 
making it possible to observe and capture Europeanization in a more objective way. Secondly, 
and perhaps more importantly, Buller and Gamble’s definition focuses on change, on becoming 
like ‘Europe’ thus rejecting definitions which involve lack of change or resistance to change. 
Using a definition of Europeanization as a change in national policies is especially relevant to the 
CEE countries, where the lack of (or resistance to) change as a result of pressure from the EU 
simply indicates lack of (or delayed) Europeanization. This situation is different from 
Europeanization in the pre-2004 member states, where lack of policy change as a result of EU 
directives, for example, could simply indicate that the country’s policies are already in 
synchrony with the EU ones, i.e. potentially a consequence of the down-top process of 
transposing domestic rules to the EU level.  
Europeanization, as defined by Radaelli and adopted by many others, and as applied to 
the EU member states could lead to a variety of outcomes. Different authors’ classifications vary 
slightly, and generally range from complete and swift adaptation to EU rules to outright 
resistance to change. Depending on the magnitude of the required change of national policies, 
Schmidt (2002) distinguishes among three possible outcomes of Europeanization, inertia or 
resistance to change, absorption and transformation. No change occurs in situations of inertia, 
absorption requires countries to make policy accommodations to address the new rule, while 
transformation leads to a reversal of national policies (901). Building on works by Boerzel   4
(1999), Cowles et al (2001), Heritier (2001) and Heritier and Knill (2001), Radaelli (2003) adds 
a forth possible outcome, retrenchment, where “national policy becomes less ‘European’ than it 
was” (38) before new EU rules were introduced.  
Relevance of Europeanization to Central and Eastern Europe 
Europeanization is typically associated with EU member states, yet the process of 
becoming like ‘Europe’ had relevance to the EU applicant countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, even prior to their EU accession. Even with a cursory knowledge of the current history 
of Central and European Europe, one could not escape the significance of the European Union 
for the politics of the region. The desire to ‘return to Europe’ shaped the foreign policy priorities 
of the CEE countries and the EU accession process fundamentally transformed their policy 
landscapes. Moreover, the nature of the accession process and the conditionality of EU 
membership are the main reason why scholars believe that Europeanization was present in the 
CEE even before these countries became members. As Grabbe (2002) points out, because of the 
conditionality of the acquis, even before accession, the CEE countries were exposed to the same 
type of pressures as EU member states. This situation is different from previous waves of 
applicants, which did not have to meet the full acquis and when the internal market acquis were 
much less inclusive. In this sense, the pressure on the applicant CEE countries to comply, prior 
to accession, with the membership criteria is very comparable to the meeting of the convergence 
criteria for monetary union by EU member states.  
  Grabbe (2002) further points out three reasons why the impact of the EU on the CEE 
applicant countries was at least as strong if not stronger than the EU impact on member states. 
The speed of adjustment necessitated by the short timeframe for accession is one of those 
reasons, a factor which contributed to the lack of discussion, both within each applicant country   5
and between the EU and the applicant countries, about the nature of the changes which the 
applicant countries had to undertake. Thus few if any policy alternatives were articulated on the 
road to EU membership, leaving only two possible outcomes, policy changes to accommodate 
accession requirements or delayed adoption of EU membership criteria. A second reason for the 
strong EU impact on the applicant countries is that the latter did not have pre-existing 
institutional arrangements which to conflict with the EU rules. Because accession coincided with 
the withdrawal of the communist state, there was much less resistance to changes coming from 
Europe, since the EU rules were not replacing well established and popular national policies.
1  
A third reason for the strong EU influence is the lack of opt-out possibilities; for 
example, unlike pre-2004 member states, the applicant countries had to unconditionally comply 
with all the accession requirements, again leaving less room for policy alternatives. These factors 
combined with the highly specific required rules which the (future) member states had to adopt 
without negotiations limited the range of possible outcomes of Europeanization. While the CEE 
countries differed in the speed with which their policies were transformed, inertia is ruled out as 
a policy outcome, since eventually all applicant countries complied with the EU rules. 
Retrenchment also did not occur. Of the two remaining possible outcomes, absorption and 
transformation, the latter is more likely given the level of misfit between national and EU 
policies at the beginning of accession negotiations.  
Towards a Model of Europeanization 
  The literature on Europeanization is still lacking agreement on what are the mechanisms 
through which developments at the EU level affect the member states, and what are the factors 
which determine the strength of the EU’s impact on domestic politics and policy. The lack of 
                                                 
1 It is possible, however, that the EU rules, as part of the accession acquis, were in conflict with pre-communist 
legacies and that this conflict affected the timing and the speed of adopting EU rules. 
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agreement is exacerbated by the wide reach of Europeanization and the numerous aspects of the 
politics and policies of member states which could be affected. For example Radaelli (2003) sees 
Europeanization as potentially affecting at least 17 domains, ranging from public discourse and 
norms to legal structures and political institutions to policy styles and outcomes.  
Below I develop a very simple model capturing the channels of the EU’s influence on the 
domestic policies of the CEE countries. The model presented here is essentially a streamlined 
summary of numerous scholars’ accounts of the process of Europeanization, with a specific 
focus on policy change. This model is based on the assumption that policy is the outcome of the 
beliefs and preferences of political actors, whose decisions are constrained by the (1) nature of 
the domestic political institutions (allowing for pressures from different social groups), (2) the 
domestic and (3) external economic constraints, limiting policy options. Thus this model does 
not directly focus on Europeanization as a result of change in discourse, norms and beliefs as 
those are still subject to political and economic institutional constraints. Within this very general 
framework, the EU’s impact of CEE policy depends on the following factors.   
A pre-condition for policy change is the existence of pressure (to change) coming from 
the European Union. Such pressure, in the form of either EU directives or conditionality acquis, 
is instrumental for setting the framework for change (Grabbe 2002). Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) 
distinguish between two types of changes stemming from EU pressure, corresponding to positive 
and negative Europeanization, respectively. The positive Europeanization is the most direct one 
and stems from the EU “prescribing concrete institutional requirements with which member 
states must comply” (2). In other words, the EU provides very specific and exact rules which 
everyone has to adopt. Such policies are aimed at replacing national policies and institutions. A 
second logic, negative Europeanization, is applicable to the adoption of policies aimed at   7
removing national ones but without being replaced by new European ones; for example 
regulations abolishing preferences for national products. Knill and Lehmkuhl’s Europeanization 
typology closely resembles Schmidt’s (2002) distinction among different types of EU pressure 
depending on its intensity: highly specified rules, less specified rules, suggested only rules, no 
decision rules (897).  
  The pressure from the EU to change policy direction, or adopt a specific set of policies 
should be the first step in determining whether Europeanization of domestic policy is occurring 
at the level of the (future) member states. Thus, the existence of EU rules which must be adopted 
at the national level is necessary but not sufficient condition for change (H1).
2 Moreover, the 
more specific the EU rules are, the greater the likelihood they will be adopted (H2). By itself, 
this proposition might seem to indicate the pre-eminence of EU-level developments over 
domestic politics. In the case of the member states, which have contractual obligations to adopt 
and adhere to EU legislation, it would be hard to show that EU rules are not taken into 
consideration. Stating the obvious role of the EU in determining policy direction at the national 
level, however, does not ignore the role of domestic political, as well as other non-EU factors, in 
policy-making. It is of course possible that a member state changes its policies in a given area 
before the adoption of EU rules is required. In such a situation, however, the trailblazer country 
would not be subject to Europeanization as defined for the purpose of this paper, i.e. a change in 
domestic politics and policy as a result of EU-level developments.  
  In the instance of the applicant countries from the CEE, it is also possible for policy 
change to occur without EU pressure, a situation which Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) 
call ‘lesson drawing’ model of Europeanization, where “states adopt EU rules because they judge 
                                                 
2 In the analysis below, the author’s first task would be to determine the existence of such rules with respect to the 
economic policy of CEE.   8
them as effective remedies to inherently domestic needs and policy challenges” (10). In such 
situations Europeanization is more likely when (1) there is a clear perception among policy-
makers that the existing domestic rules no longer produce the desired outcome, (2) the political 
institutions and the beliefs of policy-makers are permeable to outside ideas and (3) the EU 
policies have shown successful resolution of similar domestic problems elsewhere. This situation 
would hardly apply in the case of economic policy in the CEE, where pre-existing EU rules do 
not have a strong track-record of success and are controversial to say the least. Another 
possibility is that the CEE applicant countries adopt EU rules prior to EU pressure, a situation 
which is tested for in the empirical section. Whether or not, however, applicant countries 
preemptively adopt policies inline with EU regulations leads to the following non-exclusive 
possibilities; (1) policy-makers in the CEE countries share the same beliefs for policy change as 
EU officials and adopt similar policies because of correspondence of policy preferences and 
beliefs; and (2) policy-makers in the CEE countries preemptively adopt EU rules and regulations 
because they believe that such rules will be immediately imposed on them and would like to 
control their domestic agendas. Both possibilities relate to the Europeanization of beliefs, which 
I briefly discuss below.  
Provided that CEE countries are subject to pressure from the EU to adopt a specific set of 
rules whether or not policy change is likely to occur depends on a variety of domestic and 
external factors, i.e. there is generally an agreement in the literature that domestic political 
factors in particular play a significant role in shaping the outcome of policy change, in the 
presence of EU pressure (e.g. Schmidt 2002; Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006). One of the most 
obvious and popular explanation for domestic change following EU pressure is the ‘goodness of 
fit’ hypothesis (e.g. Boerzel and Risse 2000). When new EU rules are introduced, the degree to   9
which a country’s policies already comply with the new rules would determine the need for and 
the ease of adjustment and as Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) hypothesize, the “domestic adaptation 
appears to be more likely in cases where European policies imply incremental rather than 
fundamental departures from existing arrangements at the domestic level” (5) (H3). A good ‘fit’ 
between national and EU policy and preferences leads to policy absorption (Schmidt 2002), with 
few costs imposed on domestic political players and with few other (external or economic) 
considerations playing a role. A bad ‘fit’ leads either to inertia or transformation (Schmidt 2002), 
both situations in which factors other than the goodness of fit are expected to determine which 
policy direction would be followed.  
The post-1945 history of Central and Eastern Europe, the legacy of communism and the 
non-democratic pre-communist history facilitate the assumption that at the time when CEE 
countries expressed interest in becoming EU members, there was a very bad ‘fit’ between their 
policies and the EU rules, laws and regulations.
3 Thus, following Schmidt’s typology, we would 
expect one of two outcomes. CEE countries would either transform their policies to comply with 
the EU or they will show reluctance, or inertia, in introducing and implementing change. The rest 
of this section turns to the factors which might determine why a country would follow either 
path. Assuming the existence of clearly defined EU rules and a mis-fit between EU and national 
level policies, there is an array of domestic or external, political or economic factors which 
determine whether a country would transform its policies or show inertia. On the domestic level,  
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) identify the ‘social learning’ model which follows the 
logic of appropriateness and “emphasizes the identification of the CEECs with the EU and 
persuasion of the CEECs by the EU of the legitimacy of its rules as key conditions for rule 
adoption, rather than the provision of material incentives by the EU”. (9-10). This model is 
                                                 
3 Evidence suggestive of the mis-fit in terms of economic policy is discussed in the analysis section.    10
similar to Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) idea of ‘framing’ integration where Europeanization works 
by changing the beliefs and preferences of the policy actors. Following these logics, CEE policy-
makers adopt EU rules because they believe, or are persuaded to believe, that the EU rules they 
are required to adopt are legitimate, i.e. EU and CEE policy-makers share the same beliefs about 
the appropriateness of the specific EU rules (H4). The higher the legitimacy of the rules and the 
closer the match between CEE and EU beliefs, the greater the likelihood CEE policy-makers 
would adopt the EU rules.  
The propositions of the ‘social learning’ model, however, should not be discussed 
independently of other factors and institutions. Beliefs and perceptions of legitimacy in 
themselves are not sufficient to induce policy change, as policy-makers face numerous other 
political and economic constraints when adopting policy. One could even further argue that 
beliefs and perceptions of the legitimacy of EU rules are not even necessary for policy-change to 
occur. Policy-makers could and do implement policies sometimes contrary to their own beliefs 
and pre-election statements (ex. Fujimori in Peru). Beliefs and norms aside, domestic political 
constraints are expected to play a dominant role in determining the course of policy action. 
Scholars such as Schmidt (2002) and Grabbe (2002) define domestic political factors rather 
broadly, as the institutional capacity for policy change. Other scholars are more specific and 
focus on the number of policy decision-makers, and especially those who incur a cost as a result 
of the change in policy. Also utilizing political actors as explanation for policy change, Knill and 
Lehmkuhl (1999) associate the challenges to the existing preferences of political actors and the 
creation of new powerful actors with ‘negative’ Europeanization aimed at replacing pre-existing 
national policies with EU ones, where one political equilibrium is replaced with another one.   11
Following Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), the likelihood for policy change increases as 
the number of actors who would lose from it decrease (H5), a standard veto player proposition.  
The final set of propositions which could affect the adoption of EU rules by candidate 
countries relates to the external constraints imposed on the CEE countries. Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (2005), in their “external incentives” model, as well as Grabbe (2002), focus on the 
EU conditionality as a tool to induce policy change. Since the EU could threaten exclusion from 
the negotiation process or delayed accession, and as the credibility of such threats grow, so does 
the adoption of EU rules and regulations (H6). The EU conditionality is also closely related to 
the financial assistance and rewards the CEE countries receive as a result of their compliance 
with EU rules (e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005 and Grabbe 2002). Thus, the higher 
the assistance level, the greater the likelihood of EU rule adoption (H7).  
Capturing Europeanization of Economic Policy 
Europeanization defined as the impact of the European Union on the economic policies 
of the Central and Eastern European countries could be captured in numerous ways. Since my 
focus however is on the change of policy outcome, rather than change in beliefs or processes, in 
this paper I utilize two ways of measuring Europeanization of economic policy in the CEE 
countries. The first measure is developed by Cernat (2006) and captures the acquis 
approximation in all 31 chapters.
4 The Commission’s opinions, annual progress reports and other 
relevant documents are coded to reflect CEE applicant countries progress with adopting the 
acquis communautaire; no progress from previous years is coded as zero, little or unsatisfactory 
progress – one, satisfactory progress – two and significant progress – three (116). For the 
purpose of this analysis, I use the average of the scores for the internal market and economic and 
                                                 
4 I would like to thank Lucian Cernat for generously providing me with his dataset.   12
monetary union chapters. Table 1 provides the summary statistics of this Europeanization Index 
for years 1998-2002.
5 
TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE 
  The Europeanization Index based on Cernat provides a measure of legislative 
approximation of the acquis, indicating the extent to which the CEE countries made progress in 
meeting the formal requirements of the internal market and the monetary union yet the index 
does not directly capture the policy outcomes of this legislative approximation. For this purpose I 
use measures developed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
The Transition Indicators are developed for a wide range of economic reforms, such as price 
liberalization, financial and trade liberalization, competition policy, banking reform, and reform 
in other financial institutions, starting in the early 1990s. The measurement scale, which ranges 
from one to 4.33 (4+ in some accounts), compares the transition economy to the standards of the 
advanced industrialized countries. A score of one indicates little or no change from a planned 
economy, while a score of four plus (4.33) means that the country’s economic legal environment 
is no different from that of an industrialized nation. In this paper, I use a composite measure of 
the transition indicators in the areas of enterprise reform, competition policy, banking sector 
reforms, reform of non-banking financial institutions, and the extensiveness and effectiveness of 
company law. The measure is constructed by averaging the reform score in each of the above 
areas to produce an index which reflects actual economic transformation in each country. Table 2 
shows the summary statistics for the composite EBRD measure.  
TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
5 Prior to 1998, Cernat interpolates the data points, assuming that in 1990 all scores were equal to zero (personal 
communication). As this is a rather controversial procedure and I use the Europeanization Index as a dependent 
variable (in Cernat’s book, this index is an independent variable explaining economic growth), having a dependent 
variable with majority of its values constructed somewhat artificially would not lead to meaningful interpretations.    13
Analyzing the Europeanization of Economic Policy in CEE 
  The theoretical discussion presented seven propositions hypothesizing the factors which 
affect the Europeanization of economic policies in the candidate and then EU member state 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe. These factors are (1) the existence of EU rules to be 
adopted; (2) the specificity of such rules; (3) the degree of (mis)fit between EU rules and 
national policies; (4) the extent to which policy-makers believe such rules are appropriate and 
legitimate; (5) the number of policy-makers who support the policy change; (6) external 
constraints imposed by the credibility of conditionality; and (7) economic and other assistance. 
Hypotheses five and seven could be tested (against each other) statistically, while the evaluation 
of the other propositions requires a qualitative analysis, supported where appropriate by 
numerical data. Below I first briefly discuss hypotheses 1-3, the existence of specific EU rules 
regarding economic policy and the level of misfit between EU rules and pre-accession economic 
policies. I then proceed to show levels of public and political support for adopting the EU rules 
(H4), and proceed with the analysis of hypotheses five, six and seven. Where appropriate I 
elaborate on numerical ways to capture the variables used in the statistical analysis.   
The existence of EU rules regarding the economic policies of both candidate countries as 
well as all member states is without dispute. Having a functioning market economy and the 
ability to withstand the competitive pressures of the single market are among the main pre-
requisites for EU membership and the new member states from the CEE are required to also 
comply with Maastricht convergence criteria for adopting the single currency, confirming 
hypothesis one. Moreover, compared to other policy areas, the EU rules regarding the creation of 
a market economy, complying with the requirements of the single market and the monetary 
union are highly specified (Schmidt 2002), which according the hypothesis two, would increase   14
the likelihood of their adoption. The existence of highly specific and unconditional EU rules, 
however, still leaves a lot of room for variation especially in the timing of rule adoption. The 
goodness of fit between pre-existing national policies and the EU rules and directives is one 
explanation for such variations.  
While all 10 CEE countries had to build market economies, the extent of the necessary 
changes varied significantly. For example in 1991 when EBRD data was first collected, most 
CEE countries had a long way to go before being considered market economies similar to those 
in Western Europe. Regarding price liberalization, only the Baltic countries and Romania were 
lagging behind, while the other six countries had a price liberalization score of three, indicating 
that there has been substantial progress in price liberalization and state control of prices is largely 
eliminated (EBRD 1999). Yet, with respect to privatization and structural reform, all countries 
showed a great degree of misfit and even the most advanced reformer (Poland – privatization) 
had a score of only 2.5, i.e. privatization schemes are set up and ready to be implemented. Even 
Czechoslovakia which in 1991 had made the most progress towards creating the legal 
environment for a market economy had an average structural reform score of 1.75, indicating a 
great level of misfit.  
The next step in addressing the puzzle of EU influence over CEE economic policies is to 
determine the extent to which proposed EU rule are perceived as legitimate and match the beliefs 
of policy-makers from the CEE (H4). Indirectly, the level of EU legitimacy could be captured in 
public’s perceptions of the EU, assuming that a positive EU image could be interpreted as high 
levels of the legitimacy of EU rules (Table 3). Overall, the percentage of CEE citizens who view 
the EU positively is relatively high, with the exception of Estonia – at least at 30% and reaching 
close to 60% in Romania. While I am not able yet to provide a full account of the perceived   15
legitimacy of the EU rules, below I show that for the most part policy-makers in Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia did share the notion that economic policies, in 
line with the EU’s expectations to have a functioning market economy, which they pursued were 
appropriate and desirable. These conclusions are based on the analysis undertaken for a different 
project, where I studied the preferences, and corresponding policies, regarding economic 
liberalization of 31 governments in these five CEE countries for the period 1990-2005.
6 Of these 
31 governments, possibly only six were supported by parties which campaigned against the 
market economy, or at least against its radical and swift version, the cabinets of Loukanov and 
Videnov in Bulgaria, Zeman’s in the Czech Republic, Antall’s government in Hungary and the 
two Meciar governments in Slovakia. The majority of the remaining governments in the sample 
promoted and practiced a transition towards a capitalist market economy, with varying degrees 
of social protection, indicating that EU expectations (requirements) for economic policy largely 
match the beliefs and preferences of CEE policy-makers. This brief analysis shows that the 
European Union, and thus its policies, are largely perceived as legitimate by the CEE publics and 
while the publics do not always share the support for the EU’s vision of state-market relations, 
the political leaders of the then applicant countries largely did support this vision.
7 
TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE 
  The remainder of this section consists of empirical evaluation of hypotheses five, six and 
seven, utilizing the two measures of Europeanization described above.
8 The expectation from 
hypothesis five is that high number of political actors who are against (EU-induced) policy 
                                                 
6 Given the diversity of these 31 governments and their electorates, I would argue that the summary conclusions 
presented below are representative for the other five CEE countries which are now EU member states. 
7 Unfortunately, this is a very tentative and preliminary conclusion which at the moment I cannot support with 
statistical evidence. Due to the lack of complete account of the match between the policy preferences of the EU and 
CEE leaders, H4 could not be directly tested against other hypotheses.  
8 Due to the limited data points available for the Europeanization Index, a full-fledged statistical analysis is 
undertaken only for the EBRD structural reform measures.    16
change would be associated with lack of change (or lower likelihood of such). As there is a 
dearth of numerical data on the political preferences of CEE policy-makers, and as shown above 
that majority of them favor the market economy model of the EU, I extend this hypothesis to 
cover the likelihood of any policy-change based on the number of decision-makers. In the 
context of the debates over economic reform and policy in the CEE countries, two theories offer 
opposing predictions regarding what role the number of decision makers plays in determining the 
policy direction. In a nutshell, the restrictive participation model, based on the assumption that 
the economic outcomes of market economic policies take the form of the letter J, a J-curve 
shape, argues that limited participation in the political process would facilitate the adoption of 
such policies.
9 Thus restricting the number of policy-makers would make it more likely that 
those political actors - supported by the majority of the population - who are against policy 
change, would be excluded from the decision-making process and would thus not be able to 
block changes in policy direction.  
  The alternative model, of inclusive participation, makes the opposite argument, that 
greater number of policy-makers facilitates policy change because it prevents those groups which 
benefit from the lack to change from controlling the policy process and preventing change.
10 To 
put it differently, under this model, the majority of the population would benefit from policy 
reform and would thus support change. Allowing for greater participation in the policy-making 
process would make it more likely that groups desiring change would be represented. In order to 
account for the number of policy makers, I use a measure for legislative fractionalization, 
represented by the effective number of parties in parliament and computed using the formula n = 
                                                 
9 For more details on the J-curve of economic outcomes, see Balcerowicz (1994). 
10 For more details on the Partial Reform Model, see Hellman (1998).   17
1/∑si2, where n is the number of parties and si is the seat share for each party.
11 Regarding 
hypothesis six, the credibility of exclusion is rather hard to capture and evaluate numerically. 
One possible way to do so would be to consider the number of years until accession negotiations 
start, based on Haughton (2007), who argues that the conditionality powers of the EU are 
strongest in the decision-making phase right before invitations for accession negotiations are 
extended. Thus one would expect that as the time to make these decisions approached, countries 
were subject to greater pressure from the EU to adopt its rules. Finally, hypothesis seven 
supports the proposition that economic support from the European Union would give greater 
incentives for the CEE countries to adopt policies promoted by the EU. As a proxy to capture the 
level of EU support, I use per capita PHARE data. Figures 1 through 10 graph the values for the 
Europeanization Index (EI), the effective number of parties (ENP) and PHARE per capita 
spending for each of the to CEE EU member states.  
Each of the two independent variables, ENP and PHARE is graphed separately with EI 
for ease of comparison. For the period 1998-2002, when the EI data is available, none of the 
countries show significant variation in the values of the ENP variable making any conclusions 
rather ambiguous. Latvia shows no variation in ENP, while for Lithuania and Slovakia no 
relationship between ENP and EI is visible. Two countries, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, 
show – at least for part of the period – an inverse relationship between levels of Europeanization 
and effective number of parties. In Bulgaria, after 2002, greater number of decision-makers, 
measured by the ENP, is associated – at least visibly- with a decrease in Europeanization, 
conclusion which is in line with the restrictive participation model. During 1998, the inverse 
relationship between ENP and EI in the Czech Republic also confirms the expectations of the 
                                                 
11 Most of the data come from Beck et al (2001) which provide the sum of the squared seat shares in a country’s 
legislature, i.e. ∑si2. Where data are missing the author uses own calculations. 
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restrictive participation model; then a reduction in the number of decision-makers was associated 
with an increase in Europeanization. The remaining five countries, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Slovenia show trends consistent with the inclusive participation model, where 
increase in number of policy-makers is associated with a increase in the Europeanization index 
and vice versa, a decrease in one variable is associated with a decrease in another.  
Figures 11-20 graph the relationship between the Europeanization Index and the per 
capita inflows of PHARE funds for each of the 10 countries. The conclusions are somewhat 
more mixed. Hypothesis seven that increase in PHARE spending would be associated with an 
increase in Europeanization is confirmed for a number of countries and time periods; Czech 
Republic, Estonia until 2002, Latvia, Lithuania until 2001, Romania after 2000, Slovenia. For the 
remaining countries and time periods, hypothesis seven is rejected. Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Poland clearly show inverse relationship between PHARE per capita inflows and the 
Europeanization Index, while Estonia, Lithuania and Romania exhibit the reverse trend for only 
certain years. All of these conclusions of course are based only on a visual examination of the 
graphs and due to the limited data are not confirmed by statistical analysis. If any overall 
conclusion could be made it would be that the EU does not have an uniform effect on the 
candidate countries.  
  Data for the alternative way to capture Europeanization, through the EBRD structural 
reform scores measuring how close a country is to a market economy, is available for a longer 
period of time which allows for statistical analysis to be performed. Table 4 shows the results of 
time series cross sectional analysis of the impact of EU pressure, legislative fragmentation and 
EU economic assistance on Europeanization of economic policy in 10 CEE countries for the 
period 1991-2001. Other than the lagged dependent variable, only the measure for legislative   19
fragmentation is statistically significant, indicating that controlling for other factors, an increase 
in the number of policy-makers is associated with an increase in the level of Europeanization as 
measured by the policy outcome of approximating EU internal market legislation. This 
conclusion, along with the visual analysis of the EI, confirms the inclusive participation model. 
The two other variables included in the analysis, years until/since negotiation and per capita 
PHARE inflows do not reach statistical significance disconfirming hypotheses six and seven 
respectively.  
TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE 
Conclusions 
   While scholarly agreement on the definition of Europeanization is beginning to emerge, 
and so is the understanding that this phenomenon is has greater applicability to only certain 
policy areas, there is still very little research utilizing numerical measures applied to cross-
national analysis. In this paper I present a preliminary analysis of the role Europeanization 
played in shaping the direction of economic policy in 10 Central and Eastern European countries 
during the 1990s. I use two indicators of the extent to which economic policy was Europeanized 
in these countries before accession, one of the indicators capturing the level of single market and 
monetary union acquis transposition and another – the existence of a market economy in the 
(then) CEE applicant countries.  
  The analysis confirms the presence of the pre-conditions for EU influence over the 
economic policies of CEE – the existence of highly specified EU rules, conditionality, and a 
misfit between EU rules and national policies. I also show a relatively high degree of 
correspondence between the beliefs and economic model preferences of the CEE policy-makers 
and the nature of the economic model promoted by the EU, as well as a relatively high   20
percentage of CEE citizens who hold a positive image of the EU. The statistical analysis, 
however, shows that despite the existence of these rather general forces promoting 
Europeanization, domestic factors – such as the number of policy-makers – play a more 
significant role in economic policy that EU economic assistance or threat of delayed EU 
membership.   
The lack of sufficient statistical data, unfortunately, prevents more rigorous testing of 
these propositions and the results presented here are rather preliminary. Potential improvements 
of this analysis would include finding alternative ways to capture Europeanization for a longer 
time period and developing measures to better capture policy-makers beliefs and preferences (so 
that those could be included in a statistical analysis. It would also be interesting to extend the 
analysis to include the time period after the 2004 accession, and especially regarding monetary 
policies and CEE countries adoption of the convergence criteria.  
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Figure 1. Europeanization Index and Effective Number of Parties, Bulgaria, 1998-2002 
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Figure 2. Europeanization Index and Effective Number of Parties, Czech Republic, 1998-2002 
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Figure 3. Europeanization Index and Effective Number of Parties, Estonia, 1998-2002 
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Figure 4. Europeanization Index and Effective Number of Parties, Hungary, 1998-2002 
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Figure 5. Europeanization Index and Effective Number of Parties, Latvia, 1998-2002 
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Figure 6. Europeanization Index and Effective Number of Parties, Lithuania, 1998-2002 
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Figure 7. Europeanization Index and Effective Number of Parties, Poland, 1998-2002 
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Figure 8. Europeanization Index and Effective Number of Parties, Romania, 1998-2002 
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Figure 9. Europeanization Index and Effective Number of Parties, Slovakia, 1998-2002 
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Figure 10 Europeanization Index and Effective Number of Parties, Slovenia, 1998-2002 
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Figure 11. Europeanization Index and PHARE per capita inflows, Bulgaria, 1998-2002 
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Figure 12. Europeanization Index and PHARE per capita inflows, Czech Republic, 1998-2002 
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Figure 13. Europeanization Index and PHARE per capita inflows, Estonia, 1998-2002 
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Figure 14. Europeanization Index and PHARE per capita inflows, Hungary, 1998-2002 
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Figure 15. Europeanization Index and PHARE per capita inflows, Latvia, 1998-2002 
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Figure 16. Europeanization Index and PHARE per capita inflows, Lithuania, 1998-2002 
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Figure 17. Europeanization Index and PHARE per capita inflows, Poland, 1998-2002 
 
 
Poland
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
E
I
0
5
10
15
P
H
A
R
E
EI PHARE
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Europeanization Index and PHARE per capita inflows, Romania, 1998-2002 
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Figure 19. Europeanization Index and PHARE per capita inflows, Slovakia, 1998-2002 
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Figure 20. Europeanization Index and PHARE per capita inflows, Slovenia, 1998-2002 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics. Europeanization Index, 1998-2002. 
 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Bulgaria  1.35 0.399218  0.875  1.875 
Czech 
Republic 
1.7 0.541987  1.25  2.625 
Estonia  1.425 0.676618 0.625  2.25 
Hungary  1.625 0.586302 1  2.5 
Latvia  1.4 0.582291  1  2.375 
Lithuania  1.675 0.583631 1  2.5 
Poland  1.35 0.692595  0.5  2.125 
Romania  1.325 0.534731 0.625  2 
Slovakia  1.325 0.664972 0.875  2.5 
Slovenia  1.65 0.675463  0.875  2.5 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics. Structural Reforms Measure, 1991-2001. 
 
 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Bulgaria  2.17803 0.6476697 1.25 2.883333 
Czech 
Republic 
2.821212 0.5110089 1.75 3.333333 
Estonia  2.576515 0.7608276 1 3.333333 
Hungary  3.042424 0.5833982 2 3.616667 
Latvia  2.336364 0.6279074 1 3.05 
Lithuania  2.335606 0.786731 1 3.183333 
Poland  2.94697 0.5342606 2 3.45 
Romania  2.039394 0.7091573 1 2.833333 
Slovakia  2.633333 0.4298417 1.75 3.05 
Slovenia  2.54697 0.6518699 1.25 3.183333 
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Table 3. Image of the EU, 1991-2001  
 
 
Country   % Positive Image 
of the EU 
Bulgaria  47.6 
Czech 
Republic 
42.2 
Estonia  29.44 
Hungary  38.87 
Latvia  36 
Lithuania  38.67 
Poland  47.2 
Romania  57.33 
Slovakia  40.2 
Slovenia  37.88 
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Table 4. Ordinary least squares regression results for levels of structural reforms for 10 CEE 
countries, 1991-2001 
 
 
Variable Structural  Reform 
  β (pcse) 
Structural Reformt-1 .80
*** (.063) 
Negotiations .006  (.014) 
Effective number of 
parties 
.033
** (.014) 
PHARE per cap t-1 .003  (.004) 
Constant .5  (.21) 
N 96 
R
2 .87 
 
Note: The panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) are obtained by xtpcse procedure in Stata 7.0 
* p <.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 